Europe in an Asian century: Europe between the superpowers: China and Europe: opportunities or dangers? by Westad, Odd Arne
  
Odd Arne Westad 
Europe in an Asian century: Europe 
between the superpowers: China and 
Europe: opportunities or dangers? 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Westad, Odd Arne (2012) Europe in an Asian century: Europe between the superpowers: China 
and Europe: opportunities or dangers? IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) 
SR013. LSE IDEAS, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46823/ 
 
Originally available from LSE IDEAS 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2012 
 
© 2012 The Author  
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
16
China and Europe:  
Opportunities or Dangers?
Odd Arne Westad
Just when parts of the European integration project seem to be in significant amounts of trouble, Chinese leaders are beginning to open their eyes to the need for more in-depth 
cooperation with both the Union itself and with individual European countries. After years of 
relative neglect, when China’s main priorities have been the United States, the eastern Asian 
region, and the main developing economies (roughly in that order), Europe is now coming into 
fashion for discussion in Beijing, both as opportunity and threat. There are two main reasons 
for this. The first is that the global financial crisis of 2008 and the recession that followed have 
shown how dependent the Chinese economy is on European markets. The second reason is 
that some Chinese analysts have begun believing that Europe, in spite of its internal instability, 
may serve as a genuine balancer in international affairs during a period of US decline, helping 
smooth the transition to a more multipolar world. There are both possibilities and challenges 
in these perceptions, but there is little doubt that for some time at least China’s interest in 
Europe will be at an all-time high.
 
ChinA And ThE EUropEAn Union
While the first generation of Chinese revolutionaries looked to Europe for inspiration, the post-revolutionary 
generation has been looking to the United States. Those who concentrate on the rivalry that now exists 
for power and influence between the two powers tend to forget how deeply China has been influenced 
by the United States over the past generation. Ideas, technologies, and products have tended to come 
from across the Pacific – the routes to Europe have been much less trafficked. Analysts in Beijing have 
– correctly, it seems – described Sino-American ties as a love-hate relationship: just as Americans like to 
take credit for introducing capitalist markets to China, they also fear the purposes to which the Chinese 
are putting their new-found wealth. And just as the Chinese prefer American products and view the 
United States as much more ‘advanced’ than any other part of the world, they also resent the US role 
in East Asia and its ‘hegemonic’ approach to world politics.
Europe has, until quite recently, lagged far behind in the developing Chinese consciousness about 
the outside world. In the 1980s the countries of the European Community (with Britain as a partial 
exception) were mainly important to China to the degree that they were willing to confront the Soviets 
and export technology to China. In the 1990s, as China’s remarkable economic transformation took 
off, Europe’s market significance increased, but not its political relevance. In the decade that has just 
ended, economic relations have become crucial and the institutionalisation of political and diplomatic 
contacts has improved, but Europe is still not seen as relevant for the bigger picture in China’s foreign 
relations. Even on a good day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spends more than twice the hours and the 
manpower on dealing with Southeast Asia than it does with Europe. ‘In diplomatic terms,’ a top Chinese 
diplomat recently confirmed, ‘the EU is about as important for China as is Australia.’1
1  For an overview from a Chinese perspective, see Guan Chengyuan, ed., Lingjulijie du Oumeng: waijiaoguan de qianyan baogao [Studying the EU 
Up Front], (2009).
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Part of the Chinese difficulty in interacting with Europe has been the remarkable slowness with which Beijing 
has caught on to the centrality of the EU in European and world politics. Despite having inherited an empire, 
the Chinese leadership believes in nation-states, not unions or federalism. Far too often Beijing has come up 
short by interpreting the EU simply as a vehicle for the interests of the key states, and not as an integrationist 
project. In diplomatic terms, China has had some small-scale success with its consistent attempts at dealing with 
individual states rather than the Union as such. But it has failed on big issues, such as trade and environmental 
policies, where the EU has become more integrated and more consistent. (Much the same pattern can be 
seen with regard to Beijing’s policy towards the Association of Southeast Asian Nations  – ASEAN–, where 
China has had state-to-state influence on minor matters, but has failed disastrously in understanding basic 
ASEAN cohesion on trade and security matters).2
The lack of a more comprehensive reorientation in the Chinese approach to Europe is also influenced by 
Beijing’s view of the continent as a zone of instability after the Cold War ended. The images created by the 
fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and, especially, of the wars in Yugoslavia, still loom large in China, 
both among the leadership, as well as the general public. The extraordinary lack of specific knowledge even 
at higher levels in China about smaller European countries and their international and EU role, plays into this 
sense of shakiness and unpredictability. In this sense, the sovereign debt crises of 2011 play into a pattern 
already set by the past.3
The increasing Chinese concentration on Germany does not help, either, in a broader policymaking sense. 
Though the Chinese often attach great significance to the fact that roughly half of EU exports to China are 
German in origin, Germany does not have the influence on the Union’s foreign policy-making towards the 
outside world that Beijing often expects. In Europe, as we know, being bigger, richer, and more populous 
does not necessarily translate into the kind of foreign policy prowess that the Chinese expect. Looking at 
Chinese policymaking in a wider context, this parochial misapprehension is in many ways a symbol of how 
difficult it has been for Beijing to develop a more sophisticated foreign policy towards Europe.4
Although Europe as a whole is doing better in terms of knowledge about China than vice-versa, neither of the 
two sides show any of the well-developed mutual comprehension that exists between China and the United 
States. Without significant improvement in this regard, both through contacts between policymakers and 
within academia, it is unlikely that the issues in the Sino-European relationship that are dealt with below will 
move towards a more broad-based resolution. Both sides need to realise that for closer relations to develop, 
more knowledge – much beyond the pro forma – is essential.
 
EConomiC iSSUES
At present, the economic interaction between Europe and China is by far the most important aspect of the 
relationship. Since 2004 the European Union has been China’s largest trading partner, and overall economic 
relations have been expanding rapidly. EU foreign direct investment in China is at an all-time high, reaching 
€17.7 billion in 2011, and EU exports to China are growing faster than its imports.5 Chinese investments in 
Europe have grown rapidly, tripling 2009 and 2011 to €7.4 billion, across a increasingly wide range of sectors.6 
The sovereign debt crises have led China to invest in European bonds, both for political and economic reasons. 
Nonetheless, even these investments are fewer and further apart than Eurozone governments would like to see.7
2  I am grateful to the LSE’s Marie-Julie Chenard for discussions of this matter.
3  Natalia Chaban, Martin Holland, and Peter Ryan, eds., The EU through the eyes of Asia, (2007).
4  Massimiliano Andretta and Nicole Doerr, ‘Imagining Europe: Internal and External Non-State Actors at the European Crossroads,’ European Foreign Affairs 
Review 12(3) (2007), 385-400.
5  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/china/
6  Kenneth Rapoza, ‘Chinese Companies Inching Into Europe’, Forbes 10/6/2012. 
7  See Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Francoise Nicolas, ‘Complimentarity and Rivalry in EU-China Economic Relations in the Twenty-First Century,’ 
European Foreign Affairs Review 12, 13-38.
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The present situation provides Europe with great opportunities in its economic relations with China. European 
products have substantial market potential in China, and the Chinese have the funds needed to invest in 
Europe. But the EU needs to prove that it is capable of developing a trade policy that responds to the present 
situation. As François Godement has correctly argued, the Union should respond to China’s interest-driven 
economic policy with an interest-driven policy of its own. It should demand access on equal terms for European 
companies in bidding for large public projects in China; it should attempt to stimulate Chinese investment 
to where it is needed in Europe; and it should work with the emerging economies (and not just the United 
States) in developing trade policy with regard to China.8
In order to be successful, such a realistic approach to dealing with China’s growing economic influence will 
depend on the development of the necessary instruments and on a high degree of inner cohesion. Europe 
today seems to be found wanting in both respects. Chinese observers marvel over the fact that the Eurozone 
is dependent on bonds issued by the various governments rather than by the European Central Bank. They 
know, of course, that Europe would be in a much stronger position vis-a-vis China if there were Eurobonds 
covering the whole common currency area (and they also suspect that some of the current crises could thereby 
have been ameliorated, if not avoided). Beijing also benefits from the lack of coordination between member 
states and between them and Union officials on issues related to China. Although steps have been taken to 
improve the EU’s international coherence on Asian matters, the current set of crises within the EU structure 
will not help in creating a more coherent and coordinated EU policy.
In addition to realistic aims, however, the EU also needs to grasp what is the deeper background for Chinese 
policies on trade and investment. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to deliver growth in order to 
stay in power. In order to do so, it must have access to foreign markets, of which the EU at the moment is 
the largest. But the CCP does not want to be seen as giving up political positions in the process of acquiring 
what it needs. On the contrary, the EU needs to be prepared for a China that does not always act in strict 
conformity with its immediate economic aims, as the country has shown in its recent relations with ASEAN and 
the Southeast Asian region. Issues concerning human rights, the environment, and especially its relationship 
to the United States in international organizations, may all affect China’s economic policies. As a result, it is 
important to have enough knowledge to be able to identify China’s political preoccupations and – if need 
be – turn them to Europe’s advantage with regard to trade and investment.
As history often shows, the challenge for a realistic economic policy will be handling the middle-term 
perspective, five years or so down the road. As China’s economic power grows, so will its appetite for getting 
political concessions in return for economic cooperation. But such policies will not necessarily be something 
that China gains from. On the contrary, one of China’s bigger problems will be how to integrate its immediate 
interests with its growing global power in Europe and elsewhere.
 
hUmAn righTS
Current European policy on human rights in China is in a shambles. Instead of having a positive effect in China, 
it is seen by the CCP and its critics as inconsistent and self-serving, neither of which are far from the truth. 
In practice, the EU is split down the middle on how to deal with the issue, with France and Germany having 
given up its public criticism of China’s human rights violations in the late 1990s in favor of ‘quiet diplomacy’. 
Other European countries are taking the lack of elementary rights in China seriously, but are proceeding in 
a largely uncoordinated manner.9
8  See, for instance, Francois Godement and Jonas Parello-Plesner, The Scramble for Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations Brief, 2011. 
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR37_Scramble_For_Europe_AW_v4.pdf.
9  For a general overview of the human rights issue, see Jing Men and Giuseppe Balducci (eds.), Prospects and Challenges for Eu-China Relations in the 21st 
Century: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, (2010).
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In practice, member states are very happy to leave the heavy lifting on human rights issues with regard to 
China to the common EU institutions. In spite of efforts made recently by the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), there is neither the capacity nor the power within that department to deal with both policy 
development and coordination. Instead, a further harmonisation between EEAS and the human rights units 
in the Council Secretariat and the European Commission’s China desk is needed to present a viable policy 
and help convince member states to adopt it.
The political core of such a policy must be that all member states should speak with one voice on the Chinese 
government’s violations of international norms and of its own laws. Such practices have not disappeared 
with the overall strengthening of the Chinese legal system that has taken place over the past several years. 
If the EU is not seen as being consistent and honest on the issue, it will be very easy for Beijing to conclude 
that its government’s lack of respect for citizens’ rights is a matter of no consequence as far as its relations 
with Europe are concerned. Such a mistaken conclusion will necessarily lead to further difficulties in the 
European-Chinese relationship at a later stage.
 
ArmS EmBArgo
The arms embargo that the EU imposed on China after the Tian’anmen events of 1989 has become an 
embarrassing example of the EU’s political impotence. While the embargo had a political effect in the 1990s, 
it is very doubtful whether that is the case today. On the contrary, it has come to undermine parts of the EU’s 
political leverage with regard to China, having become a prime exhibit in the CCP’s domestic presentation 
of the outside world’s hostility. Because of the different positions taken by member states, however, it has 
been impossible for the EU to achieve what Cathy Ashton has suggested – namely, to remove the embargo in 
return for the deepening of cooperation with China on security issues, including those that relate to China’s 
policies towards its neighbours in Korea and Southeast Asia, and its policies on Taiwan.10
The most important link that the EU could make to such a lifting of the embargo would be Chinese compliance 
with international efforts to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power. Although China’s support 
of Iran is not in itself at this stage crucial for the Iranian nuclear program, such a change in Chinese policies 
would send a very strong signal to the regime in Teheran. And even if it would slow down rather than end 
Iran’s efforts, it would still give EU external policies a new relevance, both in the Middle East and in East Asia.
Removing the embargo would also be a way for the EU to get out from the shadow of the United States 
on its China policy. This is no aim in itself – on the contrary, US-European cooperation with regard to many 
China-related issues is important and wise. But the sense that has developed over the past five years – that 
individual European governments are keeping the embargo in place first and foremost to please the United 
States – is unhealthy. Americans and Europeans can only truly cooperate on China if each acts out of political 
conviction rather than expediency.
At present, the embargo does not serve Europe’s own security interests. Europe does not want to see a closer 
Sino-Russian partnership on advanced weapons’ systems, which seems to be in the making in part because 
of the US and European embargos. Between 1991 and 2010, over 90 percent of the heavy conventional 
weapons imported into China came from Russia, as the EU embargo created a windfall for Russian companies. 
 
 
 
10  For an excellent overview of the arms embargo issue, see Nicola Casarini, Remaking Global Order: The Evolution of Europe-China Relations and Its 
Implications for East Asia and the United States, (2009).
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With the modernization of China’s defence industry one of the main goals of the PRC’s new five-year plan, 
Beijing is set to increase its imports of state of the art equipment.11 While nobody believes that China will 
turn to European arms manufacturers for imports immediately after the embargo comes to an end, such 
a decision would at least prevent Russia from getting unnatural advantages in terms of its arms industry. 
ClimATE ChAngE
EU leaders know that if Europe’s global position is going to become more significant, they need to play a leading 
role on key issues, such as climate change policies. They also know that dealing with China is currently the 
main arena within this sector, and it will remain so, as long as the United States remain gridlocked internally. 
In spite of its lack of leadership during the Copenhagen summit, the EU has real opportunities to influence 
China on environmental issues, both in technological, as well as policy terms. What remains to be seen is 
whether European leaders are wiling to invest enough in their direct relations with China on this issue in 
order to make use of its advantages.12
While still being the world’s largest polluter, China has come a long way in realising the need for energy efficiency 
and a reduced use of fossil fuels. The new five year plan from 2011 sees sustainable growth as a real priority, 
and the potential for working with Europe – and European companies – in furthering this aim will be seen 
by Beijing as very large indeed. In technological terms, the European shift towards decarbonisation has now 
led to China looking much more to Europe than to the United States for the means to further its own goals.
There are, of course, significant difficulties in the relationship between the two in this field as well. China 
will not give up its main polluting energy production or industries, as long as the United States is not willing 
to reach reasonable and comprehensive international deals. The EU is rightly critical of Chinese double-talk, 
in which it pledges long-term support for lofty international aims, while opening new coal power stations 
every day. Also, the EU still has internal problems with support for some of the aims that the Union has 
already signed up for.
Even so, climate change policy is an almost unique field in which Sino-European cooperation may lead the 
way towards broader international deals. While the US position shows how impotent the Americans have 
become on some global issues, Beijing and Brussels are increasingly leaning in similar directions, both in 
terms of their view of the current situation and on at least some of the remedies. There is reason to believe 
that further progress may be made in direct talks over the next two years, unless other bilateral issues get 
in the way. And if European negotiators dealing with China (and to a lesser degree, India) are able to arrive 
at measures that will later become binding targets for multilateral solutions, then some of the experience of 
the EU as an integrationist project will have come to use on a global scale.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11  Richard Rousseau, ‘The Tortuous Sino-Russian Arms Trade’, CESRAN Analysis 8/6/2012. http://cesran.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=1462%3Athe-tortuous-sino-russian-arms-trade&catid=57%3Arussiaeurasiaanalysis&Itemid=312&lang=en
12  For an overview of the issues, see Constantin Holzer and Haibin Zhang, ‘The Potentials and Limits of China-Eu Cooperation on Climate Change and Energy 
Security,’ Asia Europe Journal 6(2), (2008), 217-227.
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ConClUSionS And UnCErTAinTiES
Some of the development of the relationship between China and Europe will be not be decided by either of 
the two. A key role in Sino-European relations over the next decade will – perhaps ironically – be played by the 
United States. How Washington behaves towards both regions during a time in which its political leadership 
will be tested, and its relative economic position weakened, will be of crucial importance for the future. But 
American behavior will also define much of the room for maneuver between the two other main poles in 
world politics. If the United States attempts to reassert its hegemony in Europe in wake of the economic crisis, 
the institutions of the EU may be further weakened, and differences within the Union – including on foreign 
policy – exacerbated. If, on the contrary, leaders in Washington will try to build more cooperative relations 
with the EU as an institution, both on economic and political issues – and avoid any whiff of protectionism, 
currency wars, and limiting access to technology, as the situation currently stands in light of the crisis – then 
a more coherent European approach to the rise of China may be expected.
Internal factors will, of course, also play key roles. How the sovereign debt crises in Europe are solved will 
set some of the pattern of interaction with China for the next decade or more, especially given the Chinese 
predilection for viewing the continent as a crisis zone. The solution to the Chinese government’s problems 
with a lack of internal political legitimacy will also be crucial. If the CCP allows a gradual introduction of 
political pluralism and participation, then its interaction with Europe will be much easier to develop in the 
medium term. While these obstacles are key to the future, however, neither of them should stand in the 
way for the kind of deepening interaction that the two sides need over the coming decade both in political 
and economic terms.
The global shift in wealth and power from west to east seems at the moment to be happening faster than 
most experts believed only a year ago. For Europe, even more than for the United States, such a change is an 
immense challenge to its future prosperity and stability. The solution will be found in developing, on a global 
scale, the knowledge in terms of growth and technology that Europe has accumulated over generations. 
But for such an approach to be fully implemented, the EU will need a much larger direct engagement with 
China, and with other emerging economies, than it has had up to now. ■ 
